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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-ADoPTION OF A TOTAL EXHAUSTION
RULE FOR MIXED WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS. Rose v. Lundy, 102
S. Ct. 1198 (1982).
Noah Lundy's convictions on charges of rape and crime against
nature were affirmed by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals'
and were denied review by the Tennessee Supreme Court. Follow-
ing an unsuccessful petition in a state court for post-conviction re-
lief, Lundy filed a petition in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
chapter twenty-eight of the United States Code section 2254.2 The
respondent petitioned for relief on four grounds: (1) that he had
been denied the right to confrontation because the trial court limited
the defense counsel's questioning of the victim; (2) that he had been
denied the right to a fair trial because the prosecuting attorney
stated in court that the respondent had a violent character; (3) that
he had been denied the right to a fair trial because the prosecutor
improperly remarked in his closing argument that the state's evi-
dence was uncontradicted; and (4) that the trial judge improperly
instructed the jury that every witness is presumed to tell the truth.
The United States District Court concluded from a review of the
state court records that claims three and four could not be consid-
ered in the constitutional sense because the respondent had not ex-
hausted his state remedies for those grounds.3 Nevertheless, the
district court granted the writ after "assessing the atmosphere of the
1. Lundy v. State, 521 S.W.2d 591 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) provides in relevant part:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that
the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or
that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence
of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the
prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under
the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.
3. The Tennessee Criminal Court of Appeals ruled specifically on grounds one and
two and held that although the trial court had erred, the respondent had not been prejudiced
by the errors. Claims three and four were not presented to the Tennessee Criminal Court of
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cause taken as a whole" and referred to claims three and four as
collateral to numbers one and two.4 The district court issued the
writ as a result of what the court called "flagrant prosecutorial mis-
conduct" in conjunction with the limitation of cross-examination of
the victim.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
ruling that the respondent's constitutional rights had been seriously
impaired and rejected the state's argument that the petition should
have been dismissed because both exhausted and unexhausted
claims were presented.5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed and remanded the case, holding that a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus filed under chapter twenty-eight of the United States
Code section 2254 must be dismissed by a federal district court
when it contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Rose v.
Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982).
Most modem legal historians agree that the origin of the writ of
habeas corpus pre-dates the Magna Carta.6 The first habeas corpus
order was issued in 1199 A.D., sixteen years before the Magna
Carta, and directed the production of a named person before the
court at Westminster.7 The scope of a writ of habeas corpus re-
mained confined to the narrow purpose of ensuring the appearance
of parties before the English courts until the end of the fourteenth
century.8
During the next three centuries, the scope of the writ was ex-
panded as a result of the power struggle between the common law
courts, other judicial bodies, and the sovereign.9 The expanded writ
Appeals; therefore, they would be considered unexhausted since a state remedy was still
available on these claims. Lundy v. State, 521 S.W.2d 591, 595-96 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).
4. The district court identified, considered, and cited ten instances of prosecutorial
misconduct, only five of which the respondent raised before the state courts. Rose v. Lundy,
102 S. Ct. 1198, 1200 (1982).
5. Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1200 (1982) (citing Rose v. Lundy, 624 F.2d 1100
(6th Cir. 1980)) (an unreported case).
6. See, e.g., Cohen, Some Considerations on the Origins of Habeas Corpus, 16 CAN.
BAR R. 92, 94-95 (1938); D. MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA, DUALISM OF
POWER AND LIBERTY, 5-6 (1966).
7. See D. MEADOR, supra note 6, at 8.
8. Note, Developments, Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1038, 1042 (1969-
70).
9. Id. at 1042-45. The common-law courts were trying to expand their jurisdiction at
the expense of the courts of Chancery, Admiralty and the Star Chamber. This resulted in
the common-law courts acquiring the power to challenge the jurisdiction of the other three
courts. By requiring a showing of probable cause for a confinement ordering by the sover-
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then became a means through which one court could challenge the
authority of another court to detain a person. 10 Challenges were
based on either jurisdictional incompetency 1' or unlawful, nonjudi-
cial confinement. 2
The framers of the United States Constitution recognized the
importance of the writ of habeas corpus by requiring that the privi-
lege not be suspended, except in specific circumstances. 13 Congress
first interpreted this privilege in the Judiciary Act of 178914 and em-
powered the federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus but only
for federal prisoners.15 For more than a century the Supreme Court
abided by the common law limitations placed on the scope of the
writ by reviewing only those habeas corpus petitions of federal pris-
oners that contained challenges concerning either unlawful, nonju-
dicial detentions 16 or confinements by a court lacking competence in
the matter.'7
The scope of the writ of habeas corpus was finally expanded
beyond common law limits in Exparte Sieboid, Is in which the Court
held that the constitutionality of the statute upon which a charge
was based could be examined during a habeas corpus petition hear-
ing, since an unconstitutional statute deprives the trial court of juris-
diction in the case.' 9 A further expansion in the scope of the writ
came when the federal courts were given jurisdiction to entertain
habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners.20 Finally, in Waley v.
eign, the common-law courts also won the battle to curtail the sovereign's limitless power to
imprison subjects. See also 9 W. HOLDWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 104, 109 (3d
ed. 1944); D. MEADOR, supra note 6, at 9-11.
10. Note, supra note 8, at 1042.
11. Id.
12. D. MEADOR, supra note 6, at 20-25.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, c1. 2 provides: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it."
14. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254-55
(1976)).
15. Exparte Doff, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845).
16. See, e.g., Exparte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307 (1855). The Court inquired into the
validity of an executive action. A presidential pardon reducing the prisoner's death sentence
on condition that the prisoner serve a life sentence, was held to be legal; therefore, the peti-
tion was denied.
17. Exparte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38 (1822) (writ not available where petitioner
convicted by judgment of court of competent jurisdiction).
18. 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
19. Id. at 377.
20. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
(1976)). 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) provides: "The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
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Johnston,2' the Court rejected the artificial limitations placed on the
scope of the writ by English common law courts and acknowledged
that the writ was available to consider claims of constitutional error
as well as questions of jurisdiction.22 Congress codified this newly
expanded writ of habeas corpus in 1948.23
Resolution of the issue of which types of constitutional ques-
tions of error were cognizable on federal habeas corpus review still
remained for the courts to settle. This question was resolved for
state prisoners in the landmark decision of Brown v. Allen,24 in
which the Court held that habeas corpus was unrestricted with re-
spect to the constitutional questions which can be raised by state
prisoners. 25 Not until sixteen years later did the Supreme Court in
Kaufman v. United States26 settle the question for federal prisoners
by recognizing that all constitutional claims were cognizable under
a habeas corpus proceeding. After the Kaufman decision, the
Supreme Court adopted a more restrictive view concerning the con-
stitutional claims which may be heard in federal habeas corpus peti-
tions.27 The restrictive view of the Court appears to be in response
to a revived interest in federalism and comity, which requires due
deference to state courts.28
As a result of the Supreme Court's increased response to the
doctrines of federalism and comity, the federal courts were required
to heed the basic principles of comity29 when dealing with the deci-
prisoner unless. . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States."
21. 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
22. Id. at 104-05. The Court in Waley stated that use of the writ extended beyond
questions of jurisdiction to include questions concerning the violation of a prisoner's consti-
tutional rights.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976) provides a statutory right to petition for a writ of habeas
corpus to federal prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976) provides a statutory right to petition for
a writ of habeas corpus to state prisoners.
24. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
25. Id.
26. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584 (1982); Engle v. Issac, 102 S. Ct.
1558 (1982); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976);
Reynolds, Sumner v. Matwr Twilight'r Last Gleamingfor Federal Habeas Corpus Review of
State Court Convictions? Speculations on the Future of the Great Writ, 4 UALR L.J. 289
(1981).
28. See, e.g., Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981). The Supreme Court stated that the
interests of federalism were recognized by Congress in enacting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976)
which requires deference by federal courts to determinations of all state courts. E.g. W.
DUCKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS, 181 (1980). E.g. Reynolds,
supra note 27.
29. There are three basic principles which the doctrine of comity preserves. First, it
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sions of state courts.3° The increased respect for comity by the fed-
eral courts favored the development of the exhaustion doctrine by
generally requiring the dismissal of a petition containing constitu-
tional claims that had not been exhausted at the state level.
3'
The exhaustion doctrine was first enunciated in Ex parte
Royall,32 in which the Court stated that in giving due deference to
the principles of comity, federal courts should not consider a claim
in a habeas corpus petition until after the state courts have had an
opportunity to act, thereby exhausting the claim. 33 The Court justi-
fied adoption of the exhaustion doctrine by noting that the public
good requires that the relationship between the federal and state
courts be undisturbed by unnecessary conflict since both courts are
"equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitu-
tion."' The Court also stated that the principle of comity is "a
principle of right and of law and therefore, of necessity. ' 35 The
Supreme Court reaffirmed that the concept of comity was the basis
for the exhaustion doctrine in Exparte Hawk.36 In 1948 Congress
codified the exhaustion doctrine in chapter twenty-eight of the
United States Code section 2254. 37 Although the precepts of comity
are the most important reason for the existence of the exhaustion
doctrine, some Supreme Court decisions have indicated that judicial
convenience,38 as well as prompt relief for and preservation of the
preserves the role of state courts in enforcing and applying federal law. Second, it maintains
the supervisory function of state appellate courts. Finally, it limits federal interference with
pending state proceedings. Note, Habeas Petitions with Exhausted and Unexhausted Claims;
Speedy Release, Comity and Judicial Efficiency, 57 B.U.L. REv. 864, 872-73 (1977).
30. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 17 (1978).
31. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973) (in which the Court
stated that "[t]he exhaustion doctrine is a judicially crafted instrument which reflects a care-
ful balance between important interests of federalism and the need to preserve the writ of
habeas corpus as a 'swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confine-
ment' "). Id. at 490.
32. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
33. Id. at 252.
34. Id. at 251.
35. Id.
36. 321 U.S. 114 (1944). The Court pointed out that numerous cases in which a writ of
habeas corpus had been denied were grounded on the controlling principle that federal
courts will interfere with the administration of justice only when exceptional circumstances
of peculiar urgency are shown to exist. Id. at 117.
37. See supra note 2 for text of statute. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)
(pointing out that Congress considered section 2254 to exemplify the exhaustion rule from
Exparte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944), and to declare the existing law). 372 U.S. at 434-35.
38. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128 (1950) (if an available procedure has not been ex-
hausted, then any interference by the federal courts would be needless.). In Wade v. Mayo,
334 U.S. 672 (1948), the Court pointed out that "any other rule would visit upon the federal
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prisoner's claims, 39 also serve as alternative bases for the exhaustion
doctrine.
In applying the exhaustion doctrine to the review of habeas
corpus petitions, the federal district courts .are compelled by section
225440 to classify the petitioner's claims as exhausted or
unexhausted in order to determine whether a writ should be issued.
Exhausted claims are defined in section 2254(b)4' and unexhausted
claims are defined in section 2254(c).42 Dismissal of a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus will occur if it contains unexhausted claims or
constitutes an abuse of the writ.43
The difficult question of how to handle habeas corpus petitions
that include both exhausted and unexhausted claims has led to two
distinct rules.44 Eight circuits, including the Eighth Circuit, have
ruled that the district court should consider the exhausted claims in
a mixed writ of habeas corpus and dismiss the unexhausted claims if
the unexhausted claims are either unrelated to the exhausted claims
courts an impossible burden, forcing them to supervise countless state criminal proceedings
in which deprivation of federal constitutional rights are [sic] alleged." Id. at 679-80.
39. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976) provides that a writ may not issue unless a petitioner's
claims are exhausted. This necessitates a determination by the district court judge of
whether the petitioner's claims are exhausted or unexhausted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(c) (1976).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursu-
ant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that
there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of
circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the
prisoner.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1976) provides: "An applicant shall not be deemed to have
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this sec-
tion, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the
question presented."
43. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976); Rule 9(b) of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides:
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to
allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the
merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure
of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of
the writ.
44. Miller v. Hall, 536 F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1976). The court in Miller recognized that the
federal circuits had two distinct rules. One rule, termed a rule of "total exhaustion", re-
quired all claims in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to be exhausted. The second rule
allowed a district court to consider the exhausted claims in a mixed writ of habeas corpus
and dismiss any unexhausted claims if the unexhausted claims were either unrelated to the
exhausted claims or frivolous.
or are frivolous.45 The Fifth and the Ninth Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals' have adopted a "total exhaustion" rule by requiring exhaus-
tion of all claims raised in habeas petitions.
Under a rule of "total exhaustion" the federal district courts are
required to dismiss all petitions containing exhausted and
unexhausted claims.47  Once the mixed writ is dismissed the peti-
tioner has the choice of returning to state court to exhaust his claims
or amending and resubmitting the habeas petition to present only
exhausted claims to the district court.48 The Supreme Court first
reviewed the merits of an exhausted claim in a mixed writ of habeas
corpus in Gooding v. Wilson ." The Court did not consider, per se,
the question of total exhaustion.50 Two years later the Supreme
Court expressly reserved the question of whether section 2254 re-
quired total exhaustion of all claims in a mixed writ of habeas
corpus in Francisco v. Gathright.51 Finally in Rose v. Lundy,52 the
Supreme Court answered the question reserved in Francisco by
adopting a rule of "total exhaustion" for mixed writs of habeas
45. First Circuit: Katz v. King, 627 F.2d 568 (1st Cir. 1980); Miller v. Hall, 536 F.2d
967 (1st Cir. 1976); Second Circuit: Cameron v. Fastoff, 543 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1976); Mer-
cado v. Rockefeller, 502 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Sniffen v. Follette, 393
F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1968): Third Circuit: United States ex rel. Tratino v. Hatrack, 563 F.2d 86
(3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1978); United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 372
F.2d 111 (3rd Cir. 1967); Fourth Circuit: Hewett v. State, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1967);
Sixth Circuit: Meeks v. Jago, 548 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977);
Seventh Circuit: Brown v. Wisconsin State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 457 F.2d 257 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 862 (1972); United States ex rel. Kemp v. Pate, 359 F.2d 749
(7th Cir. 1966); Eighth Circuit: Triplett v. Wyrick, 549 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1977); Tyler v.
Swenson, 483 F.2d 611 (8th Cir. 1973); Tenth Circuit: Whiteley v. Meacham, 416 F.2d 36
(10th Cir. 1969), rev'don other grounds, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Watson v. Patterson, 358 F.2d
297 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 876 (1966).
46. Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1978); Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d
807 (9th Cir. 1976); James v. Reese, 546 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Green v.
Beto, 460 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1972); Smith v. Cupp, 457 F.2d 1098 (9th Cir. 1972); Johnson v.
Wainwright, 453 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
47. 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1205 (1982).
48. ld. at 1204.
49. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
50. The Court in Gooding addressed itself to the one exhausted claim, as did the district
court, in the petitioner's mixed writ. This led the Court in Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198,
1201 n.5, (1982), to point out that Gooding did not control the present case since the question
of total exhaustion was not before the Court in Gooding.
51. 419 U.S. 59 (1974). The prisoner's petition raised the question of whether all his
claims must be exhausted in a mixed writ before a hearing. The court stated it had no
occasion to rule on this question since they had determined that the one "unexhausted"
claim in the petition had in reality, been exhausted. Id. at 63-64.
52. 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1980).
19831 NOTE
50 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:43
corpus.
53
To justify the adoption of a total exhaustion rule, Justice
O'Connor, speaking for the majority, first pointed out that section
2254(c) was too ambiguous to sustain the conclusion that Congress
had even indirectly addressed the problem raised by mixed habeas
corpus petitions.5 4 The Court pointed to the absence of any refer-
ence to mixed petitions in either the legislative history of section
2254 or pre-1948 cases an concluded that Congress had never con-
sidered the problem of mixed petitions. 5 Consequently, the Court,
following a precedent established in previous decisions, 56 looked to
the interests underlying section 2254 to resolve the ambiguities in
the legislative language.57 The Court noted that underlying section
2254 are three competing interests: (1) the state-federal interest in
comity, (2) the courts' interest in judicial efficiency and (3) the pris-
oner's interest in preservation of an prompt relief for his claims.5 8
These three interests, which the exhaustion doctrine attempts to bal-
ance, were examined and found by the majority of the Court in
Rose to be protected by a rule of "total exhaustion."59 In particular,
the majority emphasized that the policy of state-federal comity was
the primary interest which the exhaustion doctrine was designed to
protect.6°
The majority in Rose agreed that rigorous enforcement of a to-
tal exhaustion rule would result in three important benefits.6' First,
53. Id. at 1204.
54. Id. at 1202.
55. Id. at 1202-03.
56. The Supreme Court had, in past decisions, endeavored to resolve ambiguities or
omissions in statutory language by analyzing the pertinent underlying policies and interests.
Philbrook v. G!odgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975); United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970);
United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784 (1969); Unexcelled Chem. Corp. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 59 (1953).
57. 102 S. Ct. at 1203.
58. Id. at 1203-04.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1203. See also Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1 (1981). The Court in Duck.
worth notes that the exhaustion doctrine minimizes the "friction between the federal and
state systems of justice by allowing the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct
alleged violations of the prisoner's federal rights." Id. at 19. In Braden v. 30th Judicial
Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973), the Court said the exhaustion doctrine was principally
designed to protect the state court's role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent dis-
ruption of state judicial proceedings. Id. at 490. In Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950), the
Court stated: "(1]t would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal dis-
trict court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity for the state courts to
correct a constitutional violation .... (A) solution was found in the doctrine of comity
.d. at 204; See also Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
61. 102 S. Ct. at 1203-04.
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the state courts would benefit by being given the initial opportunity
to review all claims of constitutional error since a total exhaustion
rule would encourage prisoners to seek full relief from the state
courts before seeking relief at the federal level. Second, the benefit
of increased familiarity by the state courts with federal constitu-
tional issues would result from the increased numbers of prisoners
who would decide to exhaust all their federal claims at the state
level first. Finally, the total exhaustion of federal claims in state
courts would foster more complete factual records which would
benefit the federal courts in their review.
62
Although major emphasis was placed on the ways in which a
total exhaustion rule would benefit the state-federal interests in
comity, the majority also explained that judicial interest in efficiency
would be benefited. The benefit would result from a dismissal of all
mixed writs, which would relieve the district courts of the difficult
task of deciding when exhausted and unexhausted claims are re-
lated.63 The Court stated that further benefits to judicial efficiency
would be seen in a reduction of piecemeal litigation and a more
focused and thorough review of habeas petitions since a total ex-
haustion rule would encourage habeas petitioners to exhaust all
claims in state court and then present federal courts with a single
habeas petition. 64
A majority of the Court agreed that the prisoner's interest in
obtaining prompt federal relief on his claims would not be impaired
by a total exhaustion rule since the prisoner could amend his peti-
tion to delete unexhausted claims rather than return to state court to
exhaust all claims.65 The Justices disagreed on the issue of whether
a prisoner's interest in preservation of all claims might be jeopard-
ized under Rule 9(b) of chapter twenty-eight of the United States
Code section 2254.66 In a plurality opinion, Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Rehnquist, Powell and O'Connor agreed that if a pris-
oner chose the option of amending his habeas petition as provided
by a total exhaustion rule, he might risk forfeiting the deleted
unexhausted claims under Rule 9(b). 67 The plurality pointed out
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1204. In the past, eight of the federal circuits were required by the precedents
of prior interpretations of the exhaustion rule to determine whether claims in a mixed writ
were related. If the unexhausted claims were found to be related to exhausted claims, the
petition had to be dismissed. See supra note 38.
64. 102 S. Ct. at 1204.
65. Id.
66. Rule 9(b) is reprinted supra note 43.
67. 102 S. Ct. at 1204.
1983]
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that Rule 9(b) incorporated the principle governing abuse of the
writ as set forth in Sanders v. United States.68 In Sanders the Court
stated that:
if a prisoner deliberately withholds one of two grounds for fed-
eral collateral relief at the time of filing his application, in the
hope of being granted two hearings rather than one or for some
other such reason, he may be deemed to have waived his right to
a hearing on a second application presenting the withheld
ground. The same may be true if. . . the prisoner deliberately
abandons one of his grounds at the first hearing. Nothing in the
tradition of habeas corpus requires the federal courts to tolerate
needless piecemeal litigation or to entertain collateral proceed-
ings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay.
69
By classifying the prisoner's choice to amend his petition by deleting
unexhausted claims as deliberate, the plurality reasoned that subse-
quent federal petitions containing the deleted claims might be dis-
missed as an abuse of the writ.70
Justices Brennan, White and Marshall dissented from the plu-
rality's opinion that Rule 9(b) could be read to permit dismissal of
any subsequent petitions by a prisoner which are based upon the
previously deleted and unexhausted claims as abuse of the writ.7' In
their opinion, the issue of Rule 9(b)'s proper application to succes-
sive petitions should not have been addressed because it was not
among the questions presented by the petitioner nor was the issue
briefed and argued by the parties.72 In any event, Justice Brennan
refuted the plurality's proposed interpretation of Rule 9(b). The
thrust of Justice Brennan's argument centers on the appropriate in-
terpretation of the standard for dismissal of a writ for abuse as set
forth in Sanders.7 3 Justice Brennan stated that since a total exhaus-
tion rule requires a mixed writ to be dismissed, the prisoner's aban-
donment of his unexhausted claims cannot be called deliberate since
the prisoner is not permitted to proceed with his unexhausted claims
in federal court.74 If the prisoner is to gain prompt federal relief on
68. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
69. Id. at 18.
70. 102 S. Ct. at 1204.
71. Id. at 1212.
72. Id. at 1211.
73. Id. at 1212. Justice Brennan interpreted the rule in Sanders to require dismissal for
abuse of the writ only "when a prisoner was free to include all of his claims in his first
petition, but knowingly and deliberately chose not to do so in order to get more than 'one bite
of the apple' ". Id. (emphasis in original).
74. Id. at 1213.
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his claims, then he must proceed only with his exhausted claims,
and cannot therefore be said "to possess a 'purpose to vex, harass, or
delay', nor any 'hope of being granted two hearings rather than
one.' "75
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, rejected the majority's "total ex-
haustion" rule as mechanical. He suggested a more flexible rule that
would allow federal judges to exercise discretion to determine
whether the presence of an unexhausted claim in the habeascorpus
petition would make it inappropriate to consider the merits of a
properly pleaded exhausted claim.76 Justice Stevens suggested that
federal judges should use a standard which would base issuance of a
writ primarily on the fundamental unfairness of the alleged consti-
tutional violation and not on the procedural history underlying the
claim.77
The precarious balance of the competing interests served by the
exhaustion doctrine are in jeopardy after the decision in Rose. By
adopting a strict total exhaustion rule, the Supreme Court has
shifted the balance away from the prisoner's interests in preserva-
tion of and prompt relief for his claims and toward state-federal in-
terests in comity and judicial efficiency. This rule shifts the balance
by thwarting the prisoner's interest in prompt relief by requiring a
return to the state courts on his unexhausted claims even if unre-
lated and more significant exhausted claims are present. The final
shift away from the prisoner's interests may occur if the federal dis-
trict courts decide to adopt the plurality's interpretation of Rule
9(b). The plurality has interpreted Rule 9(b) to mean that when
used in conjunction with a strict total exhaustion rule, a prisoner,
whose mixed writ is dismissed, will be forced to abandon one or the
other of his interests since he must choose either to: (1) abandon his
interest in prompt relief of his claims and return to the state courts
to exhaust his claims; or (2) retain his interest in prompt relief by
amending his petition to delete the unexhausted claims, thereby
forfeiting consideration of the unexhausted claims by the "deliber-
ate" deletion. Yet surely the balance should be tipped, if at all, in
the opposite direction toward the prisoner's interest. As Mr. Chief
Justice Chase stated, "The great writ of habeas corpus has been for
centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient defence of personal
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1217.




While the scope of the writ of habeas corpus was expanding, it
tipped the balance among prisoner, judicial and state-federal inter-
ests, in favor of the prisoner's interests. With an erosion of the scope
of the writ by other Supreme Court cases79 including Rose, a
marked shift away from the prisoner's interests is apparent.
The question left unanswered is whether the Federal Circuit
Courts of Appeal will attempt to halt the shift of the balance in the
law away from prisoner's interests by choosing not to adopt the plu-
rality's interpretion of Rule 9(b). If the federal circuit courts do de-
cide to shift the balance even further from the prisoner's interests by
adopting the plurality's interpretation of Rule 9(b), then the great
writ of habeas corpus may no longer serve as the best defense of
personal freedom.
Jeannette A. Robertson
78. Exparte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall) 85, 95 (1868).
79. United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584 (1982). The Court in Frady stated that a
"plain error" standard was inappropriate for habeas review. The Court pointed out that the
higher standard of cause and prejudice enunciated in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977), was the appropriate test for habeas review on claims not raised at trial. Id. at 1593-
94. In Engle v. Issac, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982), the Court held that a claim to which no objec-
tion had been made to at trial cannot be heard collaterally in federal court on a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner can show both cause and actual prejudice. Id. at
1572. In Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981), the Court classified a state court's due pro-
cess determination as factual. The Court also stated that federal judges must give due defer-
ence to the factual findings of state courts unless error can be demonstrated by the petitioner
through "convincing" evidence. Id. at 544-45, 550. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976),
the Court stated that an exception to granting a writ of habeas corpus would occur when the
petition dealt with fourth amendment claims for which state courts provided an adequate
opportunity to prosecute. Id. at 494.
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